# Emotional prejudice, essentialism, and nationalism

# The 2002 Tajfel Lecture

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Abstract

*In explaining differences between groups, people ascribe the human essence to their ingroup and consider outgroups as less human. This phenomenon, called infra-humanization, occurs outside people's awareness. Because secondary emotions (e.g. love, hope, contempt, resentment) are considered uniquely human emotions, people not only attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups, but are reluctant to associate these emotions with outgroups. Moreover, people behave less cooperatively (in terms of altruism, imitation, and approach) with an outgroup member who expresses himself through secondary emotions. Infra-humanization occurs for high and low status groups, even in the absence of conflict between groups. It does not occur when the outgroup target is adequately individualized, by a complete name or through perspective taking, for instance.*

*The differential familiarity with the ingroup and the outgroup cannot explain infra-humanization. Yet, preliminary results show that subjective essentialism and ingroup identification may mediate the effects of infra-humanization. A connection is made between nationalism and infra-humanization. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

The minimal group paradigm occupies a special place among the many experiments and theoretical developments developed by Henri Tajfel (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; for a review, see Tajfel, 1981). The creation of the minimal group paradigm was a reaction against the realistic conflict theory, illustrated by Sherif's summer camps (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Henri Tajfel thought that limited material resources were not necessary conditions to create discrimination. In other words, claimed Tajfel, a zero-sum situation was not crucial for discrimination. For him, discrimination could also occur in a non-zero sum situation. At the time, he was looking for sufficient conditions, and found them earlier than he imagined, because the strict minimal group situation was enough to elicit strong ingroup favouritism biases (but see Brown, 1995). Paradoxically, ingroup favouritism became interpreted by some researchers as a discrimination against the outgroup, rather than as a differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup (for a review, see Brewer & Brown, 1998). In other words, the unexpected finding of ingroup favouritism in minimal conditions was conceived in terms of limited resources, although participants in these experiments could use many more resources than they did. In still other words, findings of minimal group experiments designed to counter a given theory, the realistic conflict one (Sherif, 1966a, 1966b), were interpreted by some authors in terms of this realistic conflict theory, that is, as if the resources were limited.

## INFRA-HUMANIZATION OF OUTGROUPS

Overtime, this interpretation was increasingly debated and questioned. Was ingroup favouritism really a sign of outgroup derogation? Obviously what goes to one group cannot be given to another group if resources are limited. But this limitation did not really exist in the minimal group paradigm, or, at least, the responses of the participants did not take this possible limitation into account. To distinguish between ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation, Mummendey and Otten (1998) spoke of a positive-negative asymmetry. These authors repeatedly found that participants in minimal groups are much more likely to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup when they have the opportunity to allocate positive stimuli (i.e. rewards) rather than negative ones (i.e. punishments). Brewer (1999, p. 438) suggested the striking distinction between ingroup love and outgroup hate:

> . . . many forms of discrimination and bias may develop not because outgroups are hated, but because positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and trust are reserved for the ingroup and withheld from outgroups (see also Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).

The above distinctions show a primacy of ingroup bias over outgroup derogation, and it is evident that the existence of an ingroup is a primary necessity. Without ingroups, there would be no sociability. Just imagine a Robinson Crusoe who would have been left on his deserted island since his birth. He would never have been a social being. He would never have become more than a biological magma, maybe capable to belch, but that is all (Leyens, 1979). Not only do we need people around us, as research on interpersonal relationships insists (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), but we also need privileged or significant others. These privileged others form an ingroup (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000). It is the existence of this ingroup that makes true the existence of outgroups.

Anthropological and psychosocial research provides evidence of the fact that there is no necessary correlation between ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). The correlation is often present but it is not necessary. Very often also, researchers concentrated their efforts on one of the two aspects: ingroup favouritism (e.g. Diehl, 1990) or outgroup derogation (e.g. Fein & Spencer, 1997). The distinction between the two types of biases does not mean, however, that they do not share some commonalty. Take the example of patriotism versus nationalism (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997). Being Belgians or Spanish, for instance, we are patriots if we feel pride for our country. We would be nationalists if we hated other groups than ours. If one agrees with these characteristic features (but see Hopkins, 2001), patriotism reflects an ingroup favouritism bias while nationalism combines ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation. Nationalism is a form of racism and an increasing number of researchers believe that racism is above all a manner of protecting the ingroup (e.g. Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992; Sears, 1988; Vala, 1999). As a consequence, both ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation can be seen as ways of achieving the same ultimate goal, corresponding to the ethnocentric view that the privileges and superiority of the ingroup have to be maintained and protected.

In this paper, we focus on a phenomenon which integrates both ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation, and which we have called infra-humanization of outgroups (Leyens et al., 2000). From an etymological point of view, infra-humanization conveys the meaning that some humans are considered less human than other ones. The notion is close to the ones of moral exclusion suggested by Staub (1989; see also Opotow, 1990), of delegitimization used by Bar-Tal (1989), and of lesser-perceived humanity proposed by Schwarz (Schwarz & Struch, 1989). The topic started after the French Revolution and the Declaration of Human Rights. Scholars of that time were induced to find a compromise between the statement 'we are all equals' and the practice of slavery and colonization. It was at that time that a hierarchy between groups, especially between ethnic groups, became a kind of doctrine. This doctrine, issued from some interpretations of social neo-Darwinism, led to so-called theories of primacy of races. To illustrate the generality of the phenomenon of infra-humanization, or lesser perceived humanity, it is worth mentioning that, while the Nazis took the hierarchy between groups to its ultimate end, the premises of such atrocities had started in the Anglo-Saxon world with the practice of negative eugenism (Pichot, 2000).[1]

People react differently towards an ingrouper and towards a stranger. Evidence for this comes from self-reports as well as from psycho- and neurophysiological measures (for a review, see Gugliemi, 1999). In studies conducted in this field, the measures were usually obtained from members of dominant groups while the stranger belonged to dominated and stigmatized groups. More generally, investigations on racism and its derivations such as sexism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Eberhardt & Fiske, 1998; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) have focused on the reactions of dominant groups towards dominated ones (Fiske & Leyens, 1997). When the point of view of members of stigmatized groups was taken into account, it was most often to verify how these persons dealt with prejudice in order to preserve their well-being (e.g. Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). An exclusive attention to these protection mechanisms bypasses the fact that members of dominated groups are capable of hostile reactions towards dominant groups. For instance, young African-Americans discriminate much more in favour of their ingroup (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and hold stronger negative stereotypes (Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995) than young European-Americans do towards them.

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[1]The most general definition of negative eugenism is 'preventing the reproduction of individuals who are supposedly biologically, psychologically, or intellectually "inferior"' (Pichot, 2000). This aim was obtained most of the time by sterilizing, and sometimes killing, these 'inferior' individuals. Famous scientists in favour of negative eugenism are F. Galton, K. Pearson, Charles Davenport, and G. Bell. Negative eugenism should not be confused with positive eugenism represented, for instance, by the famous bank of 'Nobel sperm'.

With the infra-humanization theory (Leyens et al., 2000), we propose a theory that applies not only to a certain category of groups, i.e. the dominant groups in a given society. We want to show that both dominant and dominated groups can infra-humanize each other. Far from being a matter of taste, this proposition results from our reading of the anthropological literature (Jahoda, 1999; Lévi-Strauss, 1952/1987; Sumner, 1906). For instance, the Alakoufs from the Tierra del Fuego originally called themselves 'the Humans'. They called the whites 'the Others' and did not want to have anything to do with them. As a consequence, they did not learn from the whites, were reduced to begging, which gave them the name of Alakouf (meaning 'give, give'), and were finally exterminated (Baudrillard, 1990). The same phenomenon occurs in Zimbabwe where the inhabitants call themselves 'Persons' differentiating themselves in this manner from all the others (Viki, personal communication, 2002). Lévi-Strauss (1952/1987) also reports that the Indians of the Caribbean Islands let the bodies of the Conquistadores putrefy in order to see whether they were humans like them. Stated otherwise, outgroup derogation is not the exclusivity of dominant groups. At some point, all groups believe that they are superior to other ones. In order to ground this statement theoretically, the concept of essentialism becomes crucial.

## SUBJECTIVE ESSENTIALISM

There are differences between individuals belonging to different groups and these differences have to be explained. At the surface level, stereotypes certainly serve as explanations (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994) and as legitimizers of existing situations (Jost & Banaji, 1994). There is probably, however, a deeper level of explanation. If one looks at history and at the place that women and Indians occupied in the church, for instance, people believe that there is something intrinsic to groups that makes them what they are and what they are not. For a long time women and Indians were not conceived as real humans because they were not supposed to have a soul, the 'something' necessary at the time to be part of humanity (Le Bras-Chopard, 2000; Todorov, 1982). This 'something' may be language, biology, religion, etc. We will call it essence. This concept is used in many fields other than psychology (Hirschfeld, 1996; Quine, 1977; Taguieff, 1987; Todorov, 1989). It probably had difficulties imposing itself in psychology because it was not readily quantifiable (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Medin, 1989; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992).

Given the potency of ethnocentrism, we arrived soon at the hypothesis that people would give a more human essence to their ingroup than to an outgroup. In other words, they would infra-humanize outgroups. But what was the human essence?

To answer this question, we asked different people who were sharing a drink with us in bars or at terraces of cafés to enumerate what would be the most typical characteristics of human nature. We were surprised by the answers. Without exception, everyone gave us the same three responses or a synonym of it: intelligence, language, and 'sentiments' (in French). To verify this anecdotal evidence, we conducted large surveys among classes of students in Louvain-la-Neuve and La Laguna; the students had simply to list as many uniquely human characteristics as they wanted. We calculated the frequencies and rankings of their answers, and found the same results as in the cafés. Values were present in the lists but not as strikenly as we had expected. On the other hand, 'émotions' (in French) were rarely mentioned. When this was the case, 'émotions' appeared only at the very end of the list. We will return to the distinction between 'sentiments' and 'émotions' very soon. There was already a large literature about the links between intelligence and language and intergroup discrimination (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Giles & Coupland, 1991). To our knowledge, nothing existed about emotions and this is one reason why we decided to concentrate on them. Another reason is that

dominated groups would probably have many difficulties infra-humanizing dominant groups on the basis of language and intelligence. By contrast, and *a priori*, their emotional inferiority was not at all obvious.

For almost one year, our greatest difficulty was to find adequate words for 'sentiments' (e.g. love, hope, contempt, resentment) and 'émotions' (e.g. joy, surprise, fear, anger). Indeed, whereas the distinction between these two terms is identical in Roman languages, it has no equivalent in some other languages. The solution was to call 'sentiments' uniquely human emotions or secondary emotions, and to call 'émotions' non-uniquely human emotions or primary emotions.[2] To arrive at these labels, we asked Spanish-speaking, French-speaking, Dutch-speaking and American-English-speaking students to rate the extent to which different emotional terms were uniquely human or non-uniquely human (meaning implicitly that the latter emotions were shared by humans and animals). The same students also rated each term for a series of characteristics, such as intensity, visibility, morality, age of appearance, etc. The same results were found for the four samples, and the characteristics that differentiated the two types of emotions corresponded to those that were identified by emotion researchers as differentiating the so-called basic or primary emotions from other emotions (Demoulin et al., in press).

If secondary emotions are uniquely associated to humans, people should respond quicker to them than to primary ones when they appear in a human context rather than in an animal one. Primary and secondary emotions were presented together with other terms related to a human context or to an animal one. Such terms were human, nose, hair, etc. for the human context, and animal, muzzle, fur, etc. for the animal context. Participants had to press a key as quickly as possible when encountering an emotional term. As expected, the response times were significantly shorter for secondary emotions in the human context (Demoulin et al., in press). Obviously, our purpose was not limited to humans versus animals. The provocative question was whether people would react in the same way when the human-animal context was replaced by an ingroup-outgroup context.

## BASIC ORIGINAL FINDINGS

If people think they are THE humans, their group should be more closely linked to uniquely human emotions than outgroups. A first set of studies used the Implicit Association Test (IAT) paradigm (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). This paradigm is sufficiently well known and does not require further description. Suffice it to say that the stimuli were ingroup names (French or Spanish), outgroup names (Arabs or Flemish), secondary and primary (positive and negative) emotions, here called 'sentiments-sentimientos' and 'émotions-emociones'. As expected, participants reacted faster to the compatible task of ingroup names-secondary emotions and outgroup names-primary emotions than to the reverse combination (Paladino et al., 2002). Unfortunately, this paradigm does not isolate the factor responsible for the differential reaction.

Therefore, in two further studies (Leyens et al., 2001), we asked members of higher and lower status groups to select a dozen characteristics typical of their ingroup or of the outgroup. The characteristics were primary and secondary emotions mixed with nouns related to competence and sociability. Again, as predicted, more secondary emotions were attributed to the ingroup than to the outgroup.

If secondary emotions characterize the ingroup, its members should be reluctant to give secondary emotions to outgroups. This hypothesis was successfully tested in a series of studies (S. Demoulin, J.-Ph. Leyens, A. P. Rodriguez, R. T. Rodriguez, M. P. Paladino, & S. T. Fiske, submitted; denying

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[2]We are grateful to Paula Niedenthal who suggested these labels.

human emotions to the outgroup; infra-humanization via biased reasoning about emotions, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2003; Gaunt, Leyens, & Demoulin, 2002; Gaunt, Leyens, & Sindic, in press; Leyens et al., 2001, Study 3). To this end, four different paradigms were used: Wason's (1968) selection task, Jacoby's (1991) dissociation task, the overattribution bias (Gilbert, 1998), and Krueger, Rothbart, and Sriram's (1989) overlapping distributions. This set of studies showed spontaneous attributions of secondary emotions to the ingroup, or associations with it. A contrasting finding emerged for the outgroup. Not only do people attribute less secondary emotions to outgroups than to the ingroup, but they also seem reluctant to give this kind of emotions to outgroups (S. Demoulin et al., submitted; denying human emotions to the outgroup; infra-humanization via biased reasoning about emotions, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2003; Leyens et al., 2001, Study 3). Secondary emotions were also processed in a much more controlled way when associated with the outgroup than with the ingroup (Gaunt, Leyens, & Demoulin, 2000). Furthermore, the overattribution bias did not occur for secondary emotions displayed by an outgroup member, meaning a complete discounting of attribution of secondary emotions to a foreigner (Gaunt, Leyens, & Sindic, in press). Put otherwise, when an outgroup member was forced to write about a secondary emotion, people took into full, rather than partial, account the situational information (Gilbert, 1998).

Attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup and denial of these emotions to outgroups are interesting in themselves, but they will not have a practical interest as long as they do not have behavioural consequences. Vaes and colleagues (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, in press) showed that behavioural consequences exist. For instance, secondary emotions expressed by an ingrouper lead to nicer replies for helping, more perspective taking, and more imitation than when these secondary emotions are provided by an outgrouper. Nothing of this sort happens for primary emotions because even animals have these basic emotions. In other words, most imitation, for instance, appears for the ingrouper who expresses himself with secondary emotions, and least imitation occurs for the outgrouper using such emotions. The amount of imitation is intermediate for the ingrouper and the outgrouper who use primary emotions. This latter amount does not differ for ingrouper and outgrouper. The same pattern of results was found for the four experiments that used this design (Vaes et al., in press). An experiment based on an approach-avoidance paradigm (e.g. Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000, Expt. 3) is particularly telling in that it shows that people apply both ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation (Vaes et al., in press, Study 4). In the research summarized above, it was hard to know whether people discriminate the outgroup through favouring the ingroup or through derogating the outgroup. The approach-avoidance measure allows to find out whether people not only deprive the outgroup from positive consequences, but also act against the outgroup. An interpretation in terms of infra-humanization would necessitate that participants not only approach faster the ingrouper who uses secondary emotions, but also avoid quicker the outgrouper expressing such emotions. The results support the prediction.

# THREE DERIVATIONS

## (1) Status and Conflict Relations Between Groups

What is the role of group status and conflict between groups in infra-humanization? The two human characteristics, intelligence and language, are determined by structural properties of societies. Indeed, intelligence and language are easily assimilated to culture and education, and stereotypically attributed to dominant groups which have better access to schools. The same is not true of uniquely human emotions, which are not dictated by the structures of societies.

Hence, status and conflict should not be involved in the infra-humanization through secondary emotions, as we found indeed (e.g. S. Demoulin et al., submitted, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology; denying emotions to the outgroup: Infra-humanization via biased reasoning about emotions, 2003). These findings do not mean that status and conflict do not influence infra-humanization. For instance, in Leyens et al.'s (2001) studies 1 and 2, dominant groups saw themselves as more talented and intelligent than dominated ones,[3] and as having more uniquely human emotions. Dominated groups, however, claimed more uniquely human emotions for themselves than for dominant ones, as well as at least similar levels of intelligence and talent. Other studies showed that stigmatized groups consider themselves less intelligent than dominant groups. For instance, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) report more agreement than disagreement among European- and African-Americans about the lower intelligence of African-Americans. We suspect that these results were obtained because the members of the stigmatized groups were not given any other opportunity to describe their situation (in the case of Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 318, the items were: 'African-Americans are less intellectually able than other groups'; 'African-Americans are lazier than other groups.'). Had stigmatized groups been asked about competence, efficiency, scholarly achievement, and intelligence, we believe they would have answered that they were less competent, less efficient, less educated, but equally intelligent.

Conflict between groups has no effect on mere infra-humanization, but it raises the question of valence of the stimuli. Because uniquely human emotions are positive and negative, the tests of the infra-humanization hypothesis commonly used both positive and negative secondary emotions. Because primary emotions were most often taken as control stimuli, we also controlled for the valence of the primary emotions. Except for the observation that positive emotions are more often chosen than negative ones for both the ingroup and the outgroup, valence did not have an effect in our first experiments (e.g. S. Demoulin et al., submitted, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology; denying emotions to the outgroup: Infra-humanization via biased reasoning about emotions, 2003; Gaunt et al., 2002; Leyens et al., 2001, Study 2; Paladino et al., 2002; Vaes et al., in press). As research accumulated, however, and as we used increasingly antagonistic groups such as Arabs and Americans after September 2001, we became aware of the impact of the negative valence of the elected stimuli. Yet, the impact was not the same for uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions. Whereas almost all the negative primary emotions were attributed to the outgroup and barely none to the ingroup, the difference was less pronounced for negative secondary emotions (B. P. Cortes, R. T. Rodriguez, A. P. Rodriguez, J.-Ph. Leyens, & S. Demoulin, unpublished work, 2002; S. Demoulin, J.-Ph. Leyens, & S. T. Fiske, unpublished work, 2002). These preliminary results need to be replicated in more sophisticated ways. A technique adapted from the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989) is a possible solution.

## (2) Identification with the Ingroup

A second type of derivation has to do with the identification with the ingroup. Because the idea of infra-humanization is based on the primacy of the ingroup, it follows that if individuals belong to a given group, but if they barely identify, they should not infra-humanize. Indeed, if people's identity is not linked to their ingroup, why would they need to differentiate the ingroup from outgroups? On the contrary, if the ingroup puts the people's identity at stake, then it becomes important to explain the differences between the cherished ingroup and other groups.

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[3]The results for intelligence and talent were not reported in Leyens et al. (2001) for editorial reasons.

Students at the University of La Laguna had to select characteristics for their ingroup and a conflicting outgroup (for the procedure, see Leyens et al., 2001). Depending on the condition, the ingroup was a group with which participants identified barely, moderately, or highly. The choice of secondary emotions for the ingroup increased with the level of identification but no infra-humanization occurred in the condition of low ingroup identification (B. P. Cortes, A. P. Rodriguez, R. T. Rodriguez, S. Demoulin, & J.-Ph. Leyens, unpublished work, 2002). A. Rohmann, P. Niedenthal, M. Brauer, and J.-Ph. Leyens (unpublished work, 2002) obtained a similar pattern of data with French and German participants. In conclusion, identification seems a crucial, but probably not sufficient, factor for the emergence of infra-humanization.

### (3) Social Categorization

A third derivation has to do with the level of categorization. Infra-humanization is clearly a dire instance of social categorization. It is not a question of interpersonal relations. Such a perspective implies that infra-humanization will tend not to occur when members of the outgroup can be individualized as specific human beings. For instance, we found that people do not infra-humanize a stranger identified by his/her first name and last name.[4] Nor did they infra-humanize outgroup exemplars whose perspective they had to take (B. P. Cortes et al., unpublished work, 2002). Unfortunately, this absence of infra-humanization is not without problems. It reminds us of the findings associated with the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954). Contact alone is a necessary but insufficient condition to make friends. This contact has to be 'deprovincialized', as Pettigrew (1998) argued. In the case of infra-humanization, contact does not diminish the effect. Indeed, Canarians have many contacts with Spanish of the mainland, as do French-speaking Belgians with Dutch-speaking Belgians or with French people. Non-infra-humanization of a concrete exemplar of the outgroup is not necessarily an optimal solution for harmonious intergroup relations. Firstly, and as reported in the literature (see Brewer & Brown, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), individuation of a particular outgroup member does not mean generalization to the whole outgroup. Secondly, individuation is often used as an excuse for non-discrimination. How many people that we consider racists claim the contrary because they have a friend of another race?

The above findings do not mean that infra-humanization of a particular individual will never occur. When this happens, however, we believe that the infra-humanized individual will be subsumed under a general category (see Vaes et al., in press). Many persons will infra-humanize a rapist of children for instance. In this case, it is likely that the individual is identified with a general category of monsters prone to paedophilia.

### ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Given the potency of the infra-humanization effect, Amélie Mummendey (personal communication, 2000) suggested that secondary emotions might be the only way to distinguish between groups. Indeed, primary emotions cannot fulfil this function since everybody, including animals, has them. We tested this possibility by asking Spanish students to rate Poles and Hungarians. Poles and Hungarians

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[4]It should be noted that in all our other experiments showing infra-humanization and using names, the ingrouper and the outgrouper were identified only by a forename. The IAT paradigm is a good example of the use of forenames to categorize people within a given social category.

received the same number of secondary emotions. Therefore, secondary emotions are not a simple device to distinguish between groups.

Another explanation that could be raised by critics relates secondary emotions to familiarity. Because it happens that secondary emotions are less visible than primary ones, it could be that people give more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups because they may detect these specific emotions more easily in their familiar ingroup than in an outgroup. Moreover, secondary emotions are more complex than primary ones. People have a more complex view of their ingroup than of outgroups because they are more familiar with the former (Linville, 1982). Because of this qualified conception of the ingroup, due to familiarity, complex emotions such as secondary ones might be privileged to describe the (complex) ingroup compared to (uniform) outgroups.

If the familiarity explanation is valid, one would expect that people attribute more secondary emotions to themselves than to their ingroup, because they know themselves better than their ingroup. Depending on the groups tested and the type of design (between- or within-participants), data show that people attribute fewer secondary emotions to themselves than to the ingroup, or the same amount (B. P. Cortes, J.-Ph. Leyens, R. T. Rodriguez, A. P. Rodriguez, & S. Demoulin, unpublished work, 2002). Obviously, these results do not fit with the familiarity explanation.

Familiarity is also related to the question of gender. Normally, one knows as many men as women. These two groups have the additional advantage that they are stereotyped differently in terms of sensitivity. According to the stereotype, compared to men, women should give themselves, and receive, more secondary emotions. Two studies were conducted to test this hypothesis (J.-Ph. Leyens, B. P. Cortes, R. T. Rodriguez, & A. P. Rodriguez, unpublished work, 2002). The first study involved men and women who belonged to different departments (female psychologists and male physicians). Contrary to the stereotype and in agreement with infra-humanization, both groups, men and women, attributed more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to the outgroup. Male and female participants in the second experiment were classmates, that is, members of a superordinate inclusive group (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This inclusion may explain the absence of infra-humanization in the second study, but it should be noted that female students did not receive (nor claimed) more secondary emotions than men (see also Viki & Abrams, 2002). Both sets of results are interesting because they show that the attribution of secondary emotions is a sufficiently strong phenomenon to resist the common stereotype that women are more sensitive than men.

## POSSIBLE MEDIATORS

When we started our research programme, we did not expect that so many groups would display an infra-humanization of outgroups. We thought that most groups would claim an equal amount of secondary emotions. Our first efforts were therefore devoted to finding situations in which infra-humanization would not occur. As evident from the above, we were able to find some such situations. However, for a long time it was impossible to find mediators of the effect, probably because most of the studies were conducted with natural groups.

In order to find possible mediators, we (S. Demoulin, B. P. Cortes, G. T. Temdayi, A. P. Rodriguez, R. T. Rodriguez, M. P. Paladino, & J. Ph. Leyens, submitted to Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin; the role of identification in infra-humanization, S. Demoulin et al., submitted, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology; denying emotions to the outgroup: Infra-humanization via biased reasoning about emotions, 2003) conducted an experiment that adopted the minimal group paradigm. Three types of groups were created on the basis of increased meaning for the participants (i.e. random, preference for colours, and for type of future career). Essentialism, identification with the ingroup,

ingroup favouritism (Tajfel's matrices), and attribution of positive secondary emotions to the ingroup and to the outgroup were measured. We expected that essentialism, ingroup identification, and infra-humanization of the outgroup would increase with the importance of the meaning attached to the ingroup. We also predicted an ingroup favouritism bias but had no hypothesis regarding the amount of this bias as a function of the conditions. As expected, ingroup identification and essentialism varied linearly as a function of the meaning of the categorization. Infra-humanization occurred only in the two meaningful conditions, and ingroup favouritism was present to the same extent in all conditions. Identification with the ingroup and essentialism proved to mediate infra-humanization, but the best predictor of infra-humanization was the common variance of identification and essentialism. Also remarkable in this study was the absence of correlation between ingroup favouritism bias and outgroup derogation (Brewer & Campbell, 1976). Such absence of relationship should not be surprising because infra-humanization of the outgroup implies both ingroup favouritism *and* outgroup derogation.

It should be noted that essentialism is a multi-faceted construct having at least two components: potential of induction and naturalness (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) or entitativity and inalterability (Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam et al., 2002; see also Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). It is not surprising that, in this minimal group study, it is the entitativity component that showed the effect and not the inalterability or naturalness one. Indeed, whatever the criteria for composing the groups, participants know that these criteria are not fundamental for their functioning in everyday life and that the groups are created for the length of the experiment. Similarity, and common goals and fate, which are the main signs of entitativity, are thus much more important in this specific situation than some kind of inalterability.

Similarly, in one of their studies, J. Vaes et al. (in press, Study 3) found that similarity with the ingroup versus outgroup mediated, although slightly, infra-humanization. Again, the information provided to participants was deliberately controlled and did not allow to infer much more than a link between similarity and belongingness to different groups.

In sum, results of mediational analysis take us back to the premises of the programme. People infra-humanize as a function of their identification with their ingroup and to the extent that they look for an essential difference between their ingroup and the outgroup. These results take us back also to the question of no infra-humanization. Decreasing ingroup identification constitutes a solution, but probably not a desirable one. The theoretical solution is to find conditions where differences between groups are not essentialized. The main weakness of our model and of our research is that we were not yet able to locate such conditions, although we are intuitively sure that we do not infra-humanize every outgroup. To solve this problem, we are presently scrutinizing other models or theories such as self-categorization (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994), ingroup projection (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), common ingroup identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991), and stereotype content (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).

# NATIONALISM

Infra-humanization, like moral exclusion, delegitimization, and lesser-perceived humanity, probably constitutes a strong defence mechanism for those who want to live in a quiet environment. It explains how one can watch apartheid, wars, and genocides on TV without being too much disturbed, or having to be sent to a psychiatric hospital. Suffice it to say that these poor survivors of war or genocides go through primary emotions, which are intense but disappear quickly. Obviously, reaction of people is totally different when someone they know and like is merely hurt. In this case, people have lasting secondary emotions (Gaunt, Sindic, & Leyens, in press).

The kind of emotional prejudice such as infra-humanization is, unfortunately, an everyday life phenomenon that one is not aware of.[5] Not once did we imagine asking plainly our Belgian students whether they had more or less secondary emotions than their French colleagues. Had we done so, we doubt we would have received answers. Had we received answers, we doubt there would have been much variability in them. Had there been some variance in the data, we are sure that the correlation between this explicit measure and the implicit measures we used would have been close to zero! This level of correlation is well known in racism research (M. Dambrun & S. Guimond, submitted; implicit and explicit measures of prejudice and stereotyping: Do they assess the same underlying knowledge in long term memory, 2001; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001).

Being unaware of one's own prejudice does not imply an absence of consequences, as evidenced by J. Vaes' et al., (in press) programme of research. In fact, lack of control, or automaticity, in prejudice may even have more perverse effects than explicit racism (Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989; Vaes et al., in press). As just mentioned, infra-humanization may co-exist with the idea that one is a sensitive person, not at all racist.

Most of our experiments were conducted with national or regional groups. We believe that infra-humanization and nationalism are the two sides of the same coin. Infra-humanization is always implicit (except in extreme cases). Nationalism is frequently explicit. It is probably explicit because of a supportive norm. To see the reality of such norm, we need only to hear what people say and look what they do about immigrants in most European countries. In fact, it is not unusual to encounter, in the 'readers' columns' of newspapers, names of animals associated with immigrants. In the same vein, after September 11th 2001, one could read in the Brussels-based newspaper 'Le Soir' (2001, Sept. 18) that the 'mad people' who had planned the terrorist attacks in the United States should not go on trial because 'they no longer have the right to be judged like "Human Beings".'

If a norm supporting nationalism exists, it can easily spread because of an illusion of veracity, or a pluralistic ignorance (Miller & McFarland, 1987). Indeed, this norm may lead some people to express publicly nationalistic ideas that they do not share, because they think that these ideas are shared by most others. This norm also makes legitimacy facile. The leap from patriotism to nationalism is indeed easy. There is always a good reason to shift from patriotism to nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Remember the 'wars of religion' or, more recently, the arguments advanced by Le Pen in France. In the last presidential elections, Le Pen presented himself as a patriot, not at all racist. The same happens with the extreme-right wing party in northern Belgium. History and the present situation—2003—in the world makes redundant any illustration of the disasters caused by infra-humanization or nationalism, whether they are called terrorism, genocide, or reprisals.

Interestingly, one sees how much infra-humanizors and nationalists pretend to integrate 'similar' people, that is, persons who have to adopt the required standards to be part of the nation of real human beings. Similarity, rather than equality or fraternity, is their motto. Differences and blends within the same community are their enemies. A link with Mummendey and Wenzel's (1999) model of ingroup projection is quite illuminating.

> ... An outgroup's difference will be evaluated negatively if both ingroup and outgroup are sufficiently included in a more abstract social category and if the ingroup's attributes are perceived as prototypical for the inclusive category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999, p. 164).

What could be a more abstract inclusive category than humankind? Also, throughout this paper, we have seen that members consider their ingroup as prototypical of this inclusive category. It follows that, in many cases, secondary emotions of ingroups will be projected onto the inclusive category to a

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[5]In our first studies, such as in the IAT series (Paladino et al., 2002), we measured explicit racism. We never reported the results because they did not correlate with infra-humanization measured at an implicit level.

larger extent than for outgroups considered less prototypical of the inclusive category. If the outgroup is conceived as really deviant and if the relation with the ingroup is nourished by conflict, the difference of projection may be extremely important.

There is still another possibility, which may better apply, we believe, to nationalism. Nationalism occurs in situations in which external forces induce people to consider their ingroup and a given outgroup as parts of a common superordinate group. Nationalists refuse such a common identity. This solution is also envisaged by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) when they consider that the difference between the groups may be so fundamental that the groups cannot be perceived as part of a superordinate category. '...The ingroup regards itself as *pars pro toto*, as if it alone defines the whole' (Mummendey & Wenzel, p. 165). We think that the nationalist refusal is still more tricky. Many nationalists consider that their reactions are not a sign of racism. They will say that they are ready to enlarge their ingroup to an inclusive ingroup, provided that the newcomers share their language, religion, or colour of skin for instance. Stated otherwise, 'others' have to become as prototypical as nationalists are of the inclusive category that nationalists themselves have defined. More often than not, this sharing is impossible, but nationalists will again claim that their refusal is not a racist one, but a radical respect of differences. The 'others' are so different that they should be viewed as belonging to a completely other category. In our words, these 'others' have definitively another essence than the human essence reserved to the ingroup.

Obviously, this line of research is rather recent. We thought that it would be more respectful to the spirit of Henri Tajfel to report work in progress rather than opening old and well classified files. Readers may find this programme on infra-humanization rather pessimistic. To them, we would like to answer that if a thing exists, it needs not necessarily exist. Because infra-humanization exists does not mean that it has to exist. However, to help fostering its absence, it might be beneficial to realize its existence first.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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